Abstract-The reliability of location-based services (LBS) is strongly dependent on the accuracy of the location of the users. However, existing LBS systems are not able to efficiently validate the position of users in large-scale outdoor environments, leading to possible location spoofing attacks by malicious users. To this end, we present an efficient and scalable Location Validation System (LVS) that secures LBS systems from location spoofing attacks. In particular, the user location is verified with the help of mobile WiFi hotspots (MHSs), who are users activating the WiFi hotspot capability of their smartphones and accept connections from nearby users, thereby validating their position inside the sensing area. The system also comprises a novel verification technique called Chains of Sight, which tackles collusion-based attacks effectively. LVS also includes a reputation-based algorithm that rules out sensing reports of location-spoofing users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the availability of localization interfaces such as GPS, cell triangulation and Wi-Fi based localization, new generation mobile devices have become the main enablers of applications that use location-based services (LBS).
LBS applications (apps) provide a service that strongly depends from the current user position. Examples of extremely popular apps based on the LBS paradigm are Foursquare (foursquare.com) and Waze (waze.com). Foursquare is an LBS app where users share their experiences about visited place, stores and restaurants. Waze is a crowdsourced traffic monitoring service, which provides information about car traffic and driving times, exploiting user reports and monitored location. Users can also provide reports about traffic jams, speed traps, fuel stations' prices, etc. Users are rewarded with points for every driven mile and for provided reports. Finally, some LBS apps have users offering services to other users, where the best offer is chosen on the base of the provider location. An example is the Uber app, where registered car drivers offer rides to app users. The user chooses the driver and requests the service directly from the app, likely choosing the closest driver to reduce waiting time. A list of some popular LBS apps where a LSA gives unfair advantages to a user is shown in Table I .
It is clear that malicious users able to change their location programmatically (i.e. providing to the system a F. Restuccia location different from the physical one), may take an unfair advantage of the rewards and generally of the specific LBS; such behavior is usually referred to as Location Spoofing Attack (LSA). Performing an LSA is all but difficult. In fact, smartphone applications (apps) like LocationHolic or FakeLocation [1] make extremely easy for users to spoof their current GPS location. LSAs are also extremely difficult to detect, given the PS system has no means to find out whether users are using apps such as FakeLocator. We point out that a successful LSA may not only bring an unfair revenue to the attacker, but also a degradation of the received service to the other users. Some examples are: (i) not objective reviews (Foursquare, Shopkick), (ii) not timely car trips (Uber), and (iii) false information on car traffic (Waze). This issue, will thus affect the reliability of the system causing a likely reduction of users, giving up for the unsatisfactory provided service.
The above discussions motivate our work and the following novel contributions. We propose a framework named Location Validation System (LVS), which efficiently and effectively tackles LSAs. LVS leverages the collaborative actions of users and the WiFi capability of smartphones to validate the position of other users. In fact, two smartphones directly connected through WiFi are practically sharing the same location, due to the limited WiFi range; thus, these two users can mutually validate their locations. The advantages of our approach will be discussed in details in Section II. A reputation-based algorithm is also proposed to filter out reports from malicious users.
The efficiency and effectiveness of LVS against locationspoofing attacks is proven through simulation experiments.
II. LOCATION VALIDATION SYSTEM
In this section, we describe in detail the LVS framework. First, we describe the system model, then, we describe in details the algorithm used by LVS to select the users acting as mobile hot-spots (MHSs), as well as the WiFi-based location validation algorithm of LVS. Finally, we describe 978-1-4799-7492-4/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE the reputation-based algorithm used by LVS to filter out unreliable reports and therefore guarantee reliability of the LBS system.
A. System Model
In order to allow mathematical formalization of the problem, we assume the sensing area can be logically divided into W location areas, in which N users can move without restrictions. In particular, we do not assume any particular user mobility pattern and model. Thus, users are free to move from one location area to another, and a given location area may contain any number of users (from 0 to N ). However, users cannot be in two different location areas at the same time. An example of sensing area for the Uber app could be a metroplex, such as the Dallas-Forth Worth area, with the Location Area being squares of 1 sq. kilometer. In case of Waze, the location area could be as large as a city block. We assume that users are connected to the Internet through WiFi or 3/4G Internet connection. Figure 1 reports a graphical description of the components of the LVS. Additional details on the architecture can be found in [2] . 
B. Location Validation Algorithm
The location validation algorithm divides time into validation rounds (Figure 2 ), occurring every T r time units; henceforth, we will refer to t j = j · T r as the time of the j-th validation round. During a validation round, the MHSs and their neighbors mutually validate their locations. A set of consecutive validation rounds is called validation epoch. This operation of mutual validation between an MHS and a user in its WiFi range is also called spotting. If the user u i is an MHS and the user u j is in its WiFi area, we say that u i spots u j and u j spots u i .
III. FORMAL ANALYSIS
After defining the main components of LVS, it is possible to extend the threat model by formally defining two attacks in addition to the LSA, arriving to a total of three attacks.
• Location Spoofing Attack. Let a LBS system have N active users U j = {u 1 , . . . , u N } at time t j and W location areas A = {A 1 , ..., A W }. A location-spoofing attack (LSA) is performed when one or more users u s (called spoofers) belonging to the set U s ⊆ U • Collusion Attack (CA). The CA is performed when one or more sets of users U c = {u 1 , . . . , u c } perform an LSA providing the location A k when they are in location areas different from A k , and at each validation round each user in U c validate the fake position in A k of all other users in U c . This attack can represent a situation in which a group of users is expected to be in a specific place, while they all are in different places. Thus, they collude mutually validating the fake position.
• Fraud Covering Attack (FCA). In the FCA, a user u m performs an LSA providing a position in A j , while located in A k . At the same time, another user u f really residing in A j validates at each validation round the position of u m in A j . With this attack, a user can be located in a low density area, in order not to be spotted by other nodes residing in A k and pretending to provide information on a different area.
A. Chains of Sights
Chains of Sight (CoS) represent the situation of a location area describing the series of direct and indirect spotting between users in a validation epoch. The CoSs have been designed to improve the performance of LVS and to effectively tackle the Collusion Attack (CA) and Fraud Covering Attack (FCA) described formerly. During each validation epoch, each user keeps track of the users spotted in the various rounds and shares this knowledge with the users spotted in the following rounds. As an example, if the user u i spotted the user u j in the round r, when at the round r + 1 is spotted by the user u k , u i will tell to u k about the presence of u j in the area. Thus u k indirectly spots u j and also validates the u j position. This information is expressed through a CoS in the following form: u j → u i /u k , read as "u j sees u k through u i ". It stems that through CoSs it is possible to reduce the number of validation round per epoch. A CoS has two main elements: the spotted node, which is the user identifier on the right end of the chain and the length which is the number of users in the chain. Notice that the chain length cannot be greater than ψ max . At the end of each validation round the collection of CoS stored by a user u i is defined as user area knowledge Ω ui , while the collection of all user area knowledges compose the global area knowledge.
Formally the CoSs are generated according to the following algorithm; 1) At each sensing round, the MHSs send their current area knowledge to the spotted users. 2) Spotted users send their current area knowledge only to their hot spot. 3) Each user including hot spots, update its area knowledge Ω l with the useful information from the received area knowledge(s).
B. Reputation Algorithm
We now introduce a simple yet effective reputation algorithm used by LVS to rule out the reports submitted by users performing LSA, collusion attack, or fraud covering. LVS assigns to each user u i reputation value ρ Since the condition b l + d l + u l = 1 must always hold, after each update the three components are normalized. We point out that ∆ b , ∆ d and ∆ u are configurable parameters of the LVS framework and can be varied to best fit to different configurations with different values of T r , e max , user density and number of location areas.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate through simulation experiments the performance of LVS in terms of resilience from attackers and efficiency. To simulate a realistic environment, we modeled the sensing area as a single location area large 4 square kms (size of a city block). As far as user mobility is concerned, we assumed users move about the location area following the Truncated Lévi Walk (TLW) mobility model [4] , which has been shown to best represent the human mobility [5] . Due to space limitations, we refer the reader to [5] for additional insights.
For the sake of simplicity, we modeled the WiFi range of the smartphones devices as circles centered on the user with radius 50 meters. The setup time T sw has been set to 7 seconds, while the validation round time T vr has been set to 15s. The validation epoch threshold M and θ have been respectively set to 0.9 and 0.8, while the q parameter has been set to 2 in all experiments. The confidence intervals are set to 95%. For the sake of graphical clarity, the confidence intervals are not shown when less than 1% of the average. In the following, we will refer to as "users" the participants not faking their position, and to "attackers" as participants who fake their position and implement the LSA described in Section 2. For the sake of simplicity, and without losing in generality, we also assumed that users remain active inside the same location area for the whole validation epoch. First, we evaluate the impact of the user density on the users' reputation and the efficiency of LVS. Figure 6 show the average reputation of all the attackers in function of the percentage of attackers in the system. Specifically, the attack has been simulated by setting the position of all attackers outside the location area, and by making them advertise a random position inside the location area to the LBS platform. We recall that we do not consider in this analysis colluding attackers. Figures 4 and 5 conclude that the attackers' reputation decreases faster when the users density is higher, due to the shorter duration of validation rounds. Therefore, LVS is able to detect faster users not advertising their real position when the users density is higher. However, as anticipated earlier, note that LVS does not increase the reputation level of attackers in any circumstance, given the location of the attackers will never be validated by any MHS. Also, note that the reputation of attackers never reaches the θ threshold necessary to accept their reports inside the LBS system. Therefore, we conclude LVS is able to exclude unreliable reports from the LBS system and therefore protects the LBS system from the location-spoofing attack, without compromising the functionality of the LBS app.
It results that when the density of users is relatively high (125 users/sq.km.), LVS is able to tolerate a very high percentage of attackers (40%) without hindering the reputation of users.
V. RELATED WORK
Over the years, several techniques have been proposed to estimate and verify the actual position of smartphone users. Approaches based on fixed, WiFi-based connectivity have been proposed in [6] , [7] , followed by techniques based on ambience-based fingerprints [8] , [9] .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed LVS, a location validation system which verifies user location in Location Based Service systems. First, we have proposed LVS, which authenticates user location in a distributed and scalable way through the use of the mobilie WiFi hotspot capability of modern smartphones. Furthermore, we have introduced the formalism of the Chains of Sight, which are used to implement an algorithm to tackle collusion-based attacks.
